I found this amazing article that provides a transparent and analytical approach to determining gun laws vs intended results. This study was presented by the RAND Corporation with the goal of ‘Objective Analysis and Effective Solutions’.

Below are the details of their ongoing study.

What Science Tells Us About the Effects of Gun Policies

Updated April 22, 2020

Good public policies are based on facts and data, and the best laws—including gun laws—are written when policymakers understand the effects of the policy on a range of outcomes and can weigh the inherent trade-offs. For gun policies, relevant outcomes can include, among others, the health of the gun industry, individuals’ ability to defend themselves, and homicide and suicide rates. In other words, policymakers need to understand the costs and benefits that different policies are likely to produce for society as a whole, including gun owners, communities wracked by violence, and other affected groups. This is not to say that understanding the true effects of policies is the only information lawmakers need. There are many other considerations as well, such as whether policies are consistent with Second Amendment protections or might infringe on other rights. Nevertheless, understanding the true effects of policies on a variety of outcomes is essential to creating policies that are both fair and effective.

As part of the RAND Gun Policy in America initiative, we conducted rigorous and transparent reviews of what current scientific knowledge could tell the public and policymakers about the true effects of many gun policies that are frequently discussed in state legislatures. Our first such review, released in 2018, synthesized the available scientific data from studies published between 2004 and 2016 examining how 13 classes of state-level gun policies affect firearm-related deaths, violent crime, the gun industry, participation in hunting and sport shooting, and other outcomes. In 2020, we released an expanded and updated review, which added five new classes of gun policies and extended the period over which we conducted our literature search to now span from 1995 to 2018. There has been a surge of new scientific publications on gun policy since our initial review, and we incorporate those studies in our updated analyses, sometimes drawing new or revised conclusions about the quality of evidence available to support claims about the effects of various policies.

We restricted our analyses to only those studies using methods designed to identify possible causal effects of the policies. For instance, studies that reported simple correlations between gun policies and various outcomes at a single point in time did not meet our inclusion criteria, because such studies provide no evidence that it is the gun policy itself that explains the outcome differences rather than other social, demographic, or historical differences between jurisdictions with and without those policies. After identifying research studies that used methods designed to establish the causal effects of gun policies, a team of RAND methodologists analyzed the studies by applying standardized and explicit criteria for determining the strength of the evidence provided by each. We categorized the scientific evidence on a relativistic scale, shown below.

Strength of Evidence Definitions

NO STUDIESNo studies meeting our inclusion criteria evaluated the policy’s effect on the outcome.INCONCLUSIVEStudies with comparable methodological rigor identified inconsistent evidence for the policy’s effect on an outcome, or a single study found only uncertain or suggestive effects.LIMITEDAt least one study meeting our inclusion criteria and not otherwise compromised by serious methodological weaknesses reported a significant effect of the policy on the outcome, and no studies with equivalent or stronger methods provided contradictory evidence.MODERATETwo or more studies⁠—at least one of which was not compromised by serious methodological weaknesses⁠—found significant effects in the same direction, and contradictory evidence was not found in other studies with equivalent or stronger methods.SUPPORTIVEAt least three studies not compromised by serious methodological weaknesses found suggestive or significant effects in the same direction using at least two independent data sets.

Summarizing the Available Evidence

After reviewing several thousand candidate studies, we identified 123 that met our inclusion criteria. These studies provided evidence for 47 of the 144 main policy effects we set out to examine (that is, the effects of each of the 18 policies on each of the eight main outcomes). We concluded that there was some evidence of an increase or decrease on an outcome for 13 of the policy effects, there was inconclusive evidence for 34 additional effects, and there were no qualifying studies that had evaluated any of the remaining effects (97). The table below summarizes the strength of evidence and direction (increase or decrease) of the effects that the scientific literature currently provides, with links to detailed syntheses of the available research.

Across all of the 18 policies that we examined, only two—child-access prevention laws and stand-your-ground laws—had evidence that we classified as supportive, our highest evidence rating, for an effect on a particular outcome. Specifically, there is supportive evidence that child-access prevention laws reduce firearm self-injuries (including suicides) and unintentional firearm injuries and deaths among children In addition, we found supportive evidence that stand-your-ground laws increase firearm homicides. 

Child-access prevention laws differ from many of the other policies we considered in our analysis. Most of the others affect either the small proportion of guns that are newly acquired every year (e.g., background checks, waiting periods) or a relatively small proportion of gun owners (e.g., prohibitions that target the mentally ill or domestic violence offenders). Child-access prevention laws, in contrast, are designed to influence how all guns in a state are stored when children could be expected to encounter them. This likely represents a large proportion of all guns because, according to U.S. Census Bureau research published in 2013, one-third of all households in the country have children under age 18, and many more have children as occasional visitors. With such large numbers of guns potentially affected, child-access prevention laws (even with imperfect compliance) may have a greater chance of producing observable effects in population-level statistics than other types of laws do.

As for stand-your-ground laws, in our initial review of the research, we found only limited or moderate evidence for the effect of such laws on total and firearm homicides; however, four new studies meeting our inclusion criteria have since been published, and all of these suggest that stand-your-ground laws elevate homicide rates. Because these laws are designed to empower victims of crime to defend themselves more effectively, it might be suggested that the rise in homicide rates is an intended effect of the laws, if the increases were driven by a surge in justifiable homicides. Although more research is needed to draw definitive conclusions about how much of the increase in homicide rates is attributable to justifiable homicides, there is reason to doubt that justifiable homicides explain the increase that stand-your-ground laws seem to cause. Consider, for instance, that there were a combined 2,201 firearm homicides in 2017 in Florida and Texas, according to data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Both states have stand-your-ground laws. If the effect size estimates for stand-your-ground laws are correct, then between 144 and 396 of these deaths could be attributable to the laws. But across the entire United States, there are only about 230 justifiable homicides recorded in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Reports annually, according to records compiled by the Violence Policy Center. Therefore, many of the additional homicides attributable to the laws in Florida and Texas must be criminal homicides.

We found moderate evidence, our second-highest evidence rating, that dealer background checks reduce firearm homicides. Most of the studies in this area examined the effects of dealer background checks or the combined effects of dealer and private-seller background checks when both are required by a state. Therefore, the evidence base for universal background checks—that is, background checks for all sales, public and private—is quite limited compared with that for the dealer background checks currently required under federal law. Of course, if there is moderate evidence that dealer background checks reduce firearm homicides, it seems likely that extending background checks to private sales of firearms could further reduce those deaths. But we must emphasize that currently available research on this question is insufficient to prove that conclusion.

We also found moderate evidence that waiting periods reduce rates of firearm suicide and total homicide and that some gun possession prohibitions associated with domestic violence reduce intimate partner homicides.

We found evidence that several other policies increase or decrease one of the outcomes examined. To view detailed syntheses of the research that led to each of these findings, as well as the evidence that we categorized as inconclusive, click on the associated box in the table above.

Despite these findings, a large majority of the effects for which we sought scientific evidence have not been investigated with sufficient rigor to be included in our review. Indeed, we found no studies examining the effects of any of the 18 policy types on officer-involved shootings or on hunting and recreation outcomes, just two studies examining how the policies affect defensive gun use, and relatively few studies evaluating effects of the policies on gun industry outcomes. These are all outcomes that are frequently raised as concerns in gun policy debates. Because there is little empirical research examining these outcomes, policymakers have limited ability to use evidence to comprehensively consider how laws are likely to affect different interests.

Does Weak Evidence Mean Gun Laws Don’t Work?

With a few exceptions, there is a surprisingly limited base of rigorous scientific evidence concerning the effects of many commonly discussed gun policies. This does not mean that these policies are ineffective; they might well be quite effective. Instead, it partly reflects shortcomings in the contributions that science has made to policy debates. It also partly reflects the policies we chose to investigate, all of which have been implemented in some U.S. states and so have proven to be politically and legally feasible (at least in some jurisdictions). This decision meant that none of the policies we examined would dramatically increase or decrease the stock of guns or gun ownership rates in ways that would produce more readily detectable effects on public safety, health, and industry outcomes.

Even a 1-percent reduction in homicides nationally would correspond to approximately 1,500 fewer deaths over a decade. 

Furthermore, the United States has a large stock of privately owned guns in circulation—estimated by the Small Arms Survey to be more than 393 million firearms in 2017. Laws designed to change who may buy new weapons, which weapons they may buy, or where and how they can use guns will predictably have only a small effect on, for example, homicide rates or participation in sport shooting, which are affected much more by the existing stock of firearms. But although small effects are especially difficult to identify with the statistical methods common in this field, they may be important. Even a 1-percent reduction in homicides nationally would correspond to approximately 1,500 fewer deaths over a decade.

By highlighting where scientific evidence is accumulating, we hope to build consensus around a shared set of facts that have been established through a transparent, nonpartisan, and impartial review process. In so doing, we also mean to highlight areas where more and better information could make important contributions to establishing fair and effective gun policies.

Link to original story/credit

On March 29, 2019 the Honorable Roger Benitz of the United Stated District Court – Southern District of California, has ruled that California’s law regarding magazine capacity is unconstitutional and has ordered summary judgement against the ban and instructed Attorny General Xavier Becerra to inform all law enforcement agencies statewide of the adjournment of California code 32310 is not longer enforceable.

In his 85 page ruling, the Judge found the law did not come close to constitutional. In his conclusion he wrote:

“Magazines holding more than 10 rounds are “arms.” California Penal Code Section 32310, as amended by Proposition 63, burdens the core of the Second Amendment by criminalizing the acquisition and possession of these magazines that are commonly held by law-abiding citizens for defense of self, home, and state. The regulation is neither presumptively legal nor longstanding. The statute hits at the center of the Second Amendment and its burden is severe. When the simple test of Heller is applied, a test that persons of common intelligence can understand, the statute fails and is an unconstitutional abridgment. It criminalizes the otherwise lawful acquisition and possession of common magazines holding more than 10 rounds – magazines that lawabiding responsible citizens would choose for self-defense at home. It also fails the strict scrutiny test because the statute is not narrowly tailored – it is not tailored at all. Even under the more forgiving test of intermediate scrutiny, the statute fails because it is not a reasonable fit. It is not a reasonable fit because, among other things, it prohibits lawabiding concealed carry weapon permit holders and law-abiding U.S Armed Forces veterans from acquiring magazines and instead forces them to dispossess themselves of lawfully-owned gun magazines that hold more than 10 rounds or suffer criminal penalties. Finally, subsections (c) and (d) of § 32310 impose an unconstitutional taking without compensation upon Plaintiffs and all those who lawfully possess magazines able to hold more than 10 rounds.

Accordingly, based upon the law and the evidence, upon which there is no genuine issue, and for the reasons stated in this opinion, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted. California Penal Code § 32310 is hereby declared to be unconstitutional in its entirety and shall be enjoined.

This decision is a freedom calculus decided long ago by Colonists who cherished individual freedom more than the subservient security of a British ruler. The freedom they fought for was not free of cost then, and it is not free now.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1) Defendant Attorney General Xavier Becerra, and his officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with him, and those duly sworn state peace officers and federal law enforcement officers who gain knowledge of this injunction order, or know of the existence of this injunction order, are enjoined from enforcing California Penal Code section 32310.

2) Defendant Becerra shall provide, by personal service or otherwise, actual notice of this order to all law enforcement personnel who are responsible for implementing or enforcing the enjoined statute. The government shall file a declaration establishing proof of such notice.

This ruling obviously is applicable to California only, however if the state elects to appeal this ruling, it will then be sent to a higher court which has wider jurisdiction in its rulings. If it makes it way to the SCOTUS, Supreme Court of the United States, the outcome would be enforceable upon the entire country as was District of Columbia (DC) vs Heller, in which the SCOTUS ruled that the second amendment is not narrowly tailored to authorize the state to have a well armed militia but the second amendment also guarantees and individual the same right to bear arms.

The full court fulling can be found her but the conclusion can be found on page 85, line 24.

The Second Amendment was adopted in 1789 and reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

 

Millions of people protect themselves and their families with guns every day in the United States. They choose guns as a means of self-defense for the same reason the Secret Service uses them to protect the president: guns stop bad people from doing bad things.

It’s absurd to speak about the right of self-defense in theory but then deny people the tools they need to exercise that right. 

Does a gun guarantee your safety? No, but it gives you the ability to defend yourself against an armed, physically superior, or mentally unstable attacker.

Why in the world would anyone not want to have the means to protect themselves and their families against criminal predators? Worse yet, why would anyone actively lobby their government to deprive themselves and every other law-abiding citizen of the most effective means to protect themselves?

Guns Are Life-Saving Tools

The gun grabbers are convinced that if we shut down the National Rifle Association and take away guns from law-abiding gun owners, then bad people will no longer have the tools to do bad things.

A gun is a tool, plain and simple. You should own a gun for the same reason you install smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, purchase fire extinguishers, and buckle your seat belt. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Smart people are prepared. Foolish people bring a knife—or nothing at all—to a gunfight.

The gun grabbers say: “There is no evidence that guns save lives.”  The truth: If there is no proof that guns save lives, then why does every American law enforcement agency, including the U.S. Secret Service, carry guns? What’s the point of the guns?

There is an old saying in the world of investing: “Do what the smart money does.” This means that when you personally invest, it makes sense to buy and sell the same investments as the “smart money” people—large banks, institutional investors, hedge funds, and investment gurus like Warren Buffett. The idea is that these industry leaders have a better understanding of the marketplace and better access to information than ordinary investors do. And that is usually true.

What do the “smart money” people do when it comes to protecting lives?

Virtually all professionals carry guns—and lots of them. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies charged with protecting the streets you walk on all carry guns. The Secret Service protects the president with guns. The federal Department of Homeland Security issues its own agents handguns and fully automatic rifles.

So, the smart money in the business of protecting lives chooses guns. That’s right. They choose guns!

Guns Are Often Used for Defense

But if you don’t want to follow the smart money on guns, then let’s turn to the statistical scoreboard. Does civilian gun use help in self-defense against criminals?

The U.S. Department of Justice investigated firearm violence from 1993 through 2011. The report found, “In 2007–2011, about 1 percent of nonfatal violent crime victims used a firearm in self-defense.” Anti-gun zealots attempt to use this statistic to discredit the use of a gun as a viable means of self-defense, and by extension, to discredit gun ownership in general.

But look deeper into the numbers. During that five-year period, the Department of Justice confirmed a total of 338,700 defensive gun uses in both violent attacks and property crimes where a victim was involved. That equals an average of 67,740 defensive gun uses every year. In other words, according to the Justice Department’s own statistics, 67,740 people a year don’t become victims because they own a gun.

Is it significant that at least 67,740 individuals use a gun in self-defense each year? Well, in 2016, 37,461 people died in motor vehicle accidents in the United States; in 2015, the number was 35,092 people. Mark Rosekind, administrator of the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA), called those road fatalities “an immediate crisis.” If the NHTSA administrator considers it a crisis that approximately 37,000 people are dying annually from car accidents, then saving nearly twice that many people each year through the use of firearms is simply stunning.

Reality

In reality, the Department of Justice findings about defensive gun uses are very conservative. A 2013 study ordered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and conducted by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council found that “Defensive use of guns by crime victims is a common occurrence…. Almost all national survey estimates indicate that defensive gun uses by victims are at least as common as offensive uses by criminals, with estimates of annual uses ranging from about 500,000 to more than 3 million . . . in the context of about 300,000 violent crimes involving firearms in 2008…. On the other hand, some scholars point to a radically lower estimate of only 108,000 annual defensive uses based on the National Crime Victimization Survey….”

The most comprehensive study ever conducted about defensive gun use in the United States was a 1995 survey published by criminologist Gary Kleck in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. This study reported between 2.1 and 2.5 million defensive gun uses every year.

Ultimately, the number of defensive gun uses doesn’t matter much to the anti-gun zealots. Whether the number is 67,000 or 2.5 million or anywhere in between, they’ll do whatever they can to dismiss defensive gun uses as insignificant. They want to focus only on the dead people lying in the street rather than those folks who use a firearm to remain standing.

I suspect those people still alive would have a different view.

The legislature has been over for a minute and wanted to provide a final update.  The only bill to pass was use of force amendment.  This directly makes changes to 76-2-402, the primary self-defense code.  As a note, the alcohol level of .05% BAC is still in effect and will lower the legal limit when it goes into effect.

 76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined.

(1) (a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that force or a threat of force is necessary to defend the person or a third person against another person’s imminent use of unlawful force.

(b) A person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if the person reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the person or a third person as a result of another person’s imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.

(2) (a) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in
Subsection (1) if the person:
(i) initially provokes the use of force against the person with the intent to use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(ii) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony , unless the use of force is a reasonable response to factors unrelated to the commission, attempted commission, or fleeing after the commission of that felony ; or
(iii) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless the person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.

(b) For purposes of Subsection (2)(a)(iii) the following do not, by themselves, constitute “combat by agreement”:
(i) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or
(ii) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to be.

(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully entered or remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(a)(iii).

(4) (a) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the Person, and arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6, Offenses Against Property.

 (b) Any other felony offense which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a forcible felony.

 (c) Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted.

(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodilyinjury;
(d) the other’s prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties’ relationship.